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Introduction
Employers often assume responsibility for the sale of an employee’s residence when that
employee is required to relocate for the company’s beneﬁt. By purchasing the employee’s
residence to resell in the open market, the employer alleviates the liquidity constraint
faced by employees who could ﬁnd it difﬁcult to purchase and maintain an additional
home during the relocation process. The existence of employee relocation assistance
programs of this nature raises questions about whether corporate relocation efforts create
a unique submarket within local single-family housing markets, and, more speciﬁcally,
whether transactions resulting from these efforts exhibit price differentials in comparison
to transactions that are not associated with an employee transfer.
Although the notion of market efﬁciency maintains that identical assets must sell for a
‘‘single price,’’ there is conﬂicting evidence in the literature regarding price differentials in
transactions involving corporate relocation programs. In particular, results provided by
Turnbull, Sirmans and Benjamin (1990) indicate no systematic price differential in
transactions involving corporate relocation efforts, but evidence reported by Dotzour
and Levi (1992) shows an approximate 5% discount in corporate relocation housing
transactions. This issue has important implications for empirical housing market
analysis, where failure to control for ownership structure may result in error from
speciﬁcation bias.
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Abstract. In this paper, we reexamine the issue of whether corporate relocation assistance
programs for transferred employees signiﬁcantly affect sale prices of single-family homes.
We estimate a hedonic price equation that includes physical housing characteristics,
location factors, occupancy status, and type of seller for a sample of 2,441 transactions.
Seller types include (a) transferred employees who were given direct relocation assistance,
(b) transferred employees who were not given direct relocation assistance, and (c) sellers
who were not facing an employment transfer. After controlling for vacancy and tenant
occupancy, we ﬁnd that houses sold by transferred employees who receive direct relocation
assistance exhibit no signiﬁcant price differential, but that houses sold by transferred
employees who do not receive direct relocation assistance sell at a discount of
approximately 3%.The lack of a consensus on this issue motivates the present study. We reexamine the
issue of whether housing price differentials result from corporate relocation programs
using a sample of transactions involving (a) sales by transferred employees who were
given direct relocation assistance, (b) sales by transferred employees who were not given
direct relocation assistance, and (c) sales that were not associated with an employee
transfer. As in previous studies, the primary question addressed here is whether houses
sold by transferred owners who receive relocation assistance exhibit price differentials.
Unlike the previous studies, however, we also consider whether price differentials exist for
houses sold by owners who faced an employment transfer, but were not provided direct
relocation assistance in the manner described above.
Our analysis further distinguishes between transactions involving owner-occupied,
tenant-occupied, and vacant houses. Turnbull et al. (1990) recognize that houses occu-
pied by the owner may provide a service ﬂow that is not available to corporate owners
and that net holding costs may be higher for vacant properties. Dotzour and Levi (1992)
do not distinguish between occupied and vacant houses in their study. Therefore, it is
possible that the results reported by Dotzour and Levi (1992) are driven by the
occupancy status of the property rather than ownership characteristics.
To reconsider potential price effects arising from corporate relocation programs, we
collected a sample of 2,441 house transactions reported by the multiple listing services for
Arlington, Texas, between December 1991 and July 1993. The sample includes 50 sales in
which the employee received direct relocation assistance (these houses were sold by
corporate relocation ﬁrms) and 121 sales of houses by transferred individuals who did
not receive employee relocation beneﬁts. Of the full sample, 477 houses were vacant
during the listing period, and 70 houses were occupied by tenants during the listing
period.
Our results indicate no signiﬁcant price differential in transactions involving trans-
ferred employees who received relocation assistance, but suggest that transactions
involving transferred employees who did not receive relocation assistance exhibit a
discount of approximately 3% in comparison to other houses in the sample. In addition,
the results indicate that occupancy status has a signiﬁcant effect on housing prices. In this
sample, houses that are vacant during the listing period sell at a discount of approx-
imately 7% in comparison to occupied properties, and houses that are occupied by
tenants during the listing period sell for a discount of approximately 13.8% in
comparison to owner-occupied properties.
The next section of this paper describes factors that may affect the minimum prices
corporate and noncorporate owners are willing to accept when selling a house. The
answer to the question of whether these factors lead to systematic price differentials is an
empirical issue. To address this issue, we propose and estimate a hedonic pricing model to
identify potential price differentials resulting from ownership structure and occupancy
status. The ﬁnal section presents a summary of our analysis.
Price Differentials: Corporate vs. Noncorporate Owners
Relocation assistance programs exist to ease the burden placed on the employee as a
result of corporate personnel strategy. Without relocation assistance, a transferred
employee could have incentive to sell the current residence at a reduced price in an
attempt to free capital, retire outstanding debt, and/or eliminate the expense of main-
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market value, the corporation protects the employee’s equity investment in the property
and generally facilitates the employee’s transfer.
After acquiring the property from the employee, the corporate owner then proceeds to
sell the property in the open market. An unsettled issue in the literature is whether
corporate owners who acquire properties as a result of employee relocation assistance are
willing to sell the houses at a different price than typically motivated owners in the local
market. Turnbull et al. (1990) derive several arguments that suggest why corporate and
noncorporate, nontransferred owners may differ as to the prices they are willing to accept
when selling single-family houses. The ﬁrst two arguments suggest that corporate owners
set minimum acceptable prices that are lower than those set by typically motivated
owners. Further arguments suggest that corporate owners have incentives to set
acceptable prices higher than those established by noncorporate owners. We consider
each of these arguments below.
Holding Costs
Because a nontransferred, noncorporate owner can consume the service ﬂow provided by
the house while waiting for an acceptable price, a noncorporate owner may have a lower
net cost of holding the house. This implies that corporations, because of potentially
higher holding costs, set lower acceptable prices than noncorporate owners who continue
to occupy their properties. Of course, this implication is valid only when the corporate-
owned house is vacant and the noncorporate-owned house is occupied. When a house is
leased to a tenant, the rent compensates the owner, whether corporate or noncorporate,
for the service ﬂow provided by the house. However, by leasing the property to a tenant,
the owner may introduce occupancy constraints on the ultimate purchaser, thereby
reducing the property’s marketability.
Tax Treatment of Gains
Second, corporate and noncorporate owners (regardless of transfer status) face tax
differentials with respect to any gains from sale. For corporate owners, any gains are
taxed at ordinary income tax rates and any losses are deductible. For individuals, capital
gains on the sale of a personal residence can be deferred if the taxpayer purchases
another residence within two years. If the taxpayer is age ﬁfty-ﬁve or over, gains of up to
$125,000 avoid taxation regardless of whether another house is purchased. However,
losses on personal residences are not tax deductible. The generally favorable tax
treatment may allow individuals to set higher minimum acceptance prices compared to
those set by corporations.
Selling Expenses and Liquidity Constraints
While both of the above arguments are consistent with price discounts for corporate-
owned transactions, other incentives exist that may lead to price premiums for corporate-
owned housing transactions. Just as the favorable tax treatment may result in higher
minimum acceptance prices for individuals, lower selling expenses may result in higher
minimum acceptance prices for corporations. Speciﬁcally, corporations may face lower
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of lower selling expenses, corporate owners can implement longer-term marketing
strategies and increase the likelihood of a higher selling price. Consequently, corporate
owners have an incentive to set higher minimum acceptance prices in comparison to
noncorporate owners. As Turnbull et al. (1990) demonstrate, this effect is the opposite of
the commonly perceived price discount associated with corporate sales.
Finally, employees who are required to relocate without relocation assistance programs
may not be able to purchase another residence in the new location until they sell their
current residence. Thus, liquidity constraints may force transferred, noncorporate owners
to set lower prices than corporate owners. Indeed, this is the typical situation for which
corporate employee relocation assistance programs are designed to resolve. By
purchasing the transferred employee’s residence, the corporation protects the employee’s
equity investment and facilitates the employee’s acquisition of a residence in the new
location.
While the above factors account for potential differences between corporate and
noncorporate sellers with respect to the optimal strategy of setting acceptance prices to
maximize the sale proceeds net of selling expenses and holding costs, it is not clear that
these differences result in ‘‘multiple prices’’ for identical assets. Furthermore, the signs
of potential price differentials could be positive or negative, depending on the relative
impact of each of these factors. Turnbull et al. (1990) note that the question of
persistent price differentials between corporate- and noncorporate-owned house
transactions is an empirical issue. The next section formulates hypotheses and tests to
determine whether these factors result in systematic price premiums or discounts across
owner types.
Model and Hypotheses
In light of the above discussion and existing empirical evidence, the question considered
here is whether persistent price differentials exist between transactions involving sellers
who are (a) corporate relocation ﬁrms or (b) transferred employees who do not receive
direct relocation assistance and sellers who are not facing an employment transfer. For
each type of seller, the optimal strategy is to balance the marginal cost of a lower price
against the marginal beneﬁt of a faster sale. To test whether there are systematic price
differentials across owner types, we propose the following hypotheses.
Ho: Transactions involving transferred employees who receive relocation
assistance do not exhibit price differentials in comparison to transactions
that do not involve transferred employees.
Ho: Transactions involving transferred employees who do not receive
relocation assistance do not exhibit price differentials in comparison to
transactions that do not involve transferred owners.
To test these hypotheses, we use a standard hedonic price model following Edmonds
(1984) and Rosen (1974) which postulates that the value of a house is a function of its
attributes. We model housing prices as a function of physical characteristics, locational
characteristics, time on market, ownership structure, and occupancy status using the
following hedonic price equation:
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where:
Xi 5 vector of property characteristics, location descriptors, and
days on market;
VACANTi 5 binary variable indicating vacant properties;
TENANTi 5 binary variable indicating tenant-occupied properties;
TRANSFERi 5 binary variable indicating that house was sold by an owner
facing a job transfer without relocation assistance;
CORPRELOi 5 binary variable indicating that the house was sold by a
corporate relocation company as a result of an employee
transfer.
In constructing the dummy variables for CORPRELO and TRANSFER, the omitted
group reﬂects sales by noncorporate owners who were not involved in an employment
transfer.
Data and Statistical Model
The sample data consists of residential transactions in Arlington, Texas, between
December 1991 and July 1993. The data were obtained through the Multiple Listing
Service (MLS), Properties Sold Database for the city of Arlington. The 2441 transactions
represent approximately 64% of all single-family home sales within the city of Arlington
during the study period, excluding those not reported through the MLS. The other 36%
of the sales reported through the MLS are either foreclosure sales or have incomplete
information for the variables used in the analysis.
By reviewing the information contained in the MLS database regarding listing ﬁrms,
and current ownership status, we identiﬁed 50 houses (approximately 2% of the sample)
that were sold by corporate relocation companies (seven different ﬁrms) as a result of
employee transfers and 121 houses (approximately 5%) that were sold by an owner facing
a job transfer without relocation assistance. The sales by transferred owners and
corporate relocation companies are geographically distributed throughout the city of
Arlington. Exhibit 1 shows means and standard deviations (when appropriate) for the
data included in the ﬁnal sample and the two subsamples.
To examine the impact of ownership and occupancy status on the selling price, we
estimate the following log-linear OLS regression model.
Ln(Selling Price) 5 f (SQFT, AGE, AGE2, BEDROOMS, BATHROOMS,
GARAGE, CARPORT, FIREPLACES, POOL,
ONESTORY, TIMETREND, VACANT, TENANT,
NORTHWEST, EASTARL, TDOM, CORPRELO,
TRANSFER) , (2)
where:
Ln (Selling Price) 5 natural logarithm of sales price;
SQFT 5 total number of square feet in the house;
AGE 5 number of years since the house was constructed;
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BATHROOMS 5 number of bathrooms;
GARAGE 5 number of parking spaces available in the garage;
CARPORT 5 1, if property has a carport; or 0, otherwise;
FIREPLACES 5 number of wood burning ﬁreplaces;
POOL 5 1, if property has an inground pool; or 0, otherwise;
ONESTORY 5 1, if house is a one-story house; or 0, otherwise;
TIMETREND 5 number of months from December 1991 (date of sale);
VACANT 5 1, if house is vacant; or 0, otherwise;
TENANT 5 1, if house is rented; or 0, otherwise;
NORTHWEST 5 1, if house is located in northwest Arlington; or 0,
otherwise;
EASTARL. 5 1, if house is located in east Arlington; or 0, otherwise;
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Exhibit 1
Descriptive Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations
Sales by Transferred 
Sales by Corporate Owners Not Receiving 
Full Sample Relocation Firms Relocation Assistance
N 2441 50 121
Selling Price 94,529 87,982 89,451
(51,506) (40,544) (35,366)
SQFT 1,880 1,889 1,846
(646) (761) (545)
AGE 14.7 14.3 10.2
(10.2) (9.08) (8.0)
BEDROOMS 3.3 3.4 3.2
(.54) (.64) (.48)
BATHROOMS 2.2 2.2 2.2
(.60) (.57) (.49)
GARAGE .95 .94 .98
(.22) (.24) (.13)
CARPORT .02 .00 .01
FIREPLACES .95 1.02 1.02
(.45) (.32) (.30)
POOL .12 .04 .06
ONESTORY .82 .88 .79
TIMETREND 10.41 10.64 10.35
(5.06) (4.91) (5.20)
VACANT .20 .48 .11
TENANT .03 .00 .02
NORTHWEST .25 .28 .12
EASTARL. .28 .32 .42
TDOM 125.31 130.80 120.64
(137.40) (132.44) (123.49)
CORPRELO .020 NA NA
TRANSFER .050 NA NA
Note: standard deviations of the continuous and the discrete, nonbinary variables are shown in
parentheses.
Source: Computed by the Authors from sample dataTDOM 5 number of days on the market;
CORPRELO 5 1, if house is sold by a corporate relocation company;
or 0, otherwise;
TRANSFER 5 1, if house is sold by an individual who has been
transferred; 0, otherwise.
The variables CORPRELO and TRANSFER are used to test our hypotheses regarding
price differentials associated with employee transfers (with and without relocation
assistance, respectively) in comparison to transactions that do not involve employee
transfers.
Empirical Results
Estimating the log-linear model described above using the 2441 observations provides the
results shown in Exhibit 2. The model explains approximately 87% of the variation in the
selling price for this sample of MLS transactions. Sixteen of eighteen variables in the
model are signiﬁcant at a 5% or better level of conﬁdence.
The results indicate that inground pools, garages, ﬁreplaces, square footage, one-story
houses, a location in Northwest Arlington, and the number of bathrooms have a positive
association with the selling price of houses in the sample. Variables indicating property
age, vacant properties, tenant-occupied properties, properties located in East Arlington,
and individually owned properties where the owner has been transferred without reloca-
tion assistance, have a negative association with sales price. The time trend variable is
signiﬁcant and positive, demonstrating increasing selling prices over the study period.
The insigniﬁcant variables include CARPORT, BEDROOMS, TDOM, and CORPRELO.
Variance inﬂation factors are provided to detect the severity of multicollinearity in the
independent variables. Following Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1985), a maximum
variance inﬂation factor in excess of 10 suggests that multicollinearity may be unduly
inﬂuencing the estimates. In this model, the maximum variance inﬂation factor is 8.561.
In addition, the variance inﬂation factors for the key variables in this study (VACANT,
TENANT, CORPRELO, and TRANSFER) are close to 1.0 and, therefore, do not
indicate multicollinearity.
For this study, the results of most interest center on any relationship between selling
price and the variables VACANT, TENANT, CORPRELO, and TRANSFER. The
coefﬁcient estimates for CORPRELO and TRANSFER directly test the hypotheses for
price effects related to the ownership types. We include the variables VACANT and
TENANT to control for occupancy status of the house at the time of sale.
The coefﬁcient for corporate-owned property, CORPRELO, is insigniﬁcant, indicating
there is no price effect associated with sales by corporate relocation ﬁrms. This result
supports the ﬁndings reported by Turnbull et al. (1990). The evidence that there is a
single market price for houses sold by relocation ﬁrms and those sold by individual
owners not facing a transfer does not dispel the arguments either for or against price
effects in corporate-owned housing transactions. Rather, we can only conclude that, if
these arguments are valid, they counteract one another to result in a neutral overall
impact on the price of housing.
The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on CORPRELO contradicts the results of Dotzour and
Levi (1992), who show that houses sold by a corporate relocation ﬁrm sell at a discount.
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When our model is rerun using the same data, except that VACANT and TENANT are
omitted, the coefﬁcient for CORPRELO is signiﬁcant at a 10% level and negative,
implying a discount to corporate-owned housing of 4.6%, a result that is comparable to
the approximately 5% discount observed by Dotzour and Levi. These results illustrate the
importance of controlling for occupancy status in the model.
The parameter estimate for TRANSFER indicates that properties owned by
individuals facing an employment transfer without direct relocation assistance sold for
an average of 3.03% less than other homes in the sample. The resulting t-statistic
indicates that this parameter estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and provides evidence
for rejecting the hypothesis that transactions involving transferred owners who do not
receive relocation assistance do not exhibit price differentials. When occupancy status is
not controlled, the coefﬁcient for TRANSFER is still negative, but signiﬁcant only at a
10% level. The results for TRANSFER imply that liquidity constraints faced by a
transferred individual (who is not beneﬁtting from a relocation-assistance program),
inﬂuence the prices that these individuals accept for their houses. 
The importance of controlling for occupancy status has already been demonstrated.
Selling price discounts are associated with both vacant and tenant-occupied houses. The
evidence suggests that the loss of the service ﬂow of housing, as associated with vacant
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Exhibit 2
Regression Results: Dependent Variable=In (Selling Price)
Std  Signif.
Coeff. Coeff. Error Level VIF
Intercept 10.460 .039
SQFT .403 E-3 .101 E-4 ** 3.815
AGE 2.019 .959 E-3 ** 8.561
AGE2 .159 E-3 .199 E-4 ** 7.643
BEDROOMS 2.011 .008 1.836
BATHROOMS .102 .010 ** 3.317
GARAGE .076 .019 ** 1.697
CARPORT .021 .031 1.521
FIREPLACES .048 .001 ** 1.749
POOL .124 .011 ** 1.120
ONESTORY .032 .010 ** 1.451
TIMETREND .002 .662 E-3 ** 1.010
VACANT 2.070 .009 ** 1.047
TENANT 2.138 .020 ** 1.027
NORTHWEST .134 .009 ** 1.380
EASTARL 2.103 .009 ** 1.324
TDOM .420 E-4 .246 E-4 1.023
CORPRELO 2.037 .026 1.020
TRANSFER 2.031 .015 * 1.025
Adjusted R2 .873
F [19, 2421] 929.31 **
Note: Double asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at 1% or better; single asterisks indicate signiﬁcance
at 5% or better.
Source: Computed by the Authors from sample dataproperties, results in a discount of 7% on the selling price. For leased properties, where
the owner sacriﬁces marketability and direct control over the maintenance of the quality
of the house, the estimated discount is even larger, having a magnitude of 13.8%.1
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this article is to empirically test whether house prices in transactions
involving employment transfers exhibit price differentials. In particular we distinguish
between transactions in which the employee receives employee relocation assistance and
those in which the employee does not receive relocation assistance. Using a large sample
of single-family house sales from the Arlington, Texas area, we ﬁt a log-linear hedonic
price equation to test for price differentials.
With regard to our hypotheses, we conclude that there is no price differential between
corporate relocation sales and houses sold by owners who were not facing an employ-
ment transfer. Properties sold by transferred owners who were not provided employee
relocation assistance, however, sell at a discount of approximately 3%. The signiﬁcant
discount in these transactions is evidence of the ﬁnancial beneﬁts provided to employees
who have access to these programs.
The results of this study indicate that houses owned by individuals who have been
transferred without relocation assistance, vacant houses, and tenant-occupied houses
may sell for ‘‘multiple prices.’’ While the results do not provide sufﬁcient evidence to
conclude that the housing market is inefﬁcient, they do provide guidance for using these
properties as comparable sales in the appraisal process. To the extent that these discounts
are measurable and predictable, these types of transactions can be used as comparable
sales with appropriate adjustments.
Note
1We also tested the TENANT and VACANT variables on the sample of properties that did not
involve corporate relocations or transfers (n52270). The results are not substantially different from
those shown in Exhibit 2. In the subsample, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant price discounts of 6.4% for vacant
properties and 12.6% for tenant-occupied properties.
References
Dotzour, M. G. and D. R. Levi, The Impact of Corporate Ownership on Residential Transaction
Prices, Journal of Real Estate Research, 1992, 7:2, 207–16.
Edmonds, R., A Theoretical Basis for Hedonic Regression: A Research Primer, AREUEA Journal,
1984, 12:1, 72–85.
Neter, J., W. Wasserman and M. H. Kutner, Applied Linear Statistical Models, Homewood, Ill.:
Irwin, second edition 1985, Ch. 11.
Rosen, S., Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition,
Journal of Political Economy, 1974, 82, 35–55.
Turnbull, G. K., C. F. Sirmans and J. D. Benjamin, Do Corporations Sell Houses for Less? A Test
of Housing Market Efﬁciency, Applied Economics, 1990, 22, 1389–98.
We thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor, G. Donald Jud, for their helpful
comments.
IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE RELOCATION ASSISTANCE ON HOUSING 75